Water UK has apologised for past performance, as have a number of the water companies. There is a collective promise to make good the sewers, and to spend an extra £10 billion to achieve this. This first has to pass OFWAT’s scrutiny and feeds into the periodic review of water prices in 2024 (PR24). The companies say this will be paid for by increasing customers’ bills. Politicians and consumer groups (and much of the media) have supported the investment, but have been hostile to the putting up of the bills.
Who should pay? The conventional answer in the water regulation model set up at privatisation is that the companies come up with their business plans, OFWAT then scrutinises them to assess whether they are efficiently costed, sets the cost of capital, updates the regulatory asset bases (RABs), and then determines the bills. Under this model, customers should indeed pay if the reason for the poor performance of the sewers is down to OFWAT not allowing customers’ bills to rise more in the past. It is, on this view, catch-up time.
What this amounts to is Water UK and the companies apologising for OFWAT’s short-termism, and if Water UK and the companies are at fault, they have not pushed hard enough for more investment in the past.
Water UK and the water companies would be right to point the finger at OFWAT’s significant failures to regulate the industry and, in particular, its preference for the short-term limiting of bills over long-term sustainability.
But in pointing to OFWAT’s failures, the companies do not get off the hook, for the most important part of the context of the current debates about the sewers and the rivers is that much of what needs to be done is capital maintenance, properly measured, and not solely new enhancement investment. This really matters, because if the companies have not been maintaining their assets properly, then they have not delivered their side of the regulatory bargain, even if OFWAT has let them get away with it.
Capital maintenance and the licence obligations
The water industry was rightly privatised on the basis of current-cost accounting (CCA). This form of accounting is appropriate because of the long-lived nature of the assets, and the requirement to effectively deliver the services, notably clean drinking water and sewage treatment to prevent harm to rivers, in perpetuity.
What this means is that the water companies should be maintaining their sewers in a fit state to deal with sewage, so that the quality of the effluent discharged does not deteriorate, and discharges of untreated sewage are a rare event. This is the operating concept of capital maintenance, which may go beyond the maintenance of physical assets in perpetuity.
The fact of recent experience is that the water companies have not monitored what has been going on, and hence they have not known whether they are in fact maintaining the physical assets, let alone the operating services. It is pretty obvious that any responsible management, and especially any management of public services such as those delivered by the water companies, should actually know how their assets are performing. What we now know is that they didn’t know because they were not monitoring the combined sewer overflows (CSOs) properly, and in some cases not at all.
Capital maintenance is an operating cost, not a capital cost. There is no case at all for borrowing to cover capital maintenance. The failure of the sewers means that operating costs have been cut back at the expense of the assets and services, and they should not have been.
The licence obligations
This brings us to the licences. What exactly are water companies responsible for delivering – and liable for failures to deliver? In theory, the regulator allows a rate of return (strictly speaking, “fixes prices”) on the basis that the companies carry out the functions – in this case, providing on-demand clean drinking water and disposing of sewage after waste treatment into rivers and the sea. Having properly functioning CSOs, fixing the leaks and managing supplies in periods of scarcity fall within these brackets.
The water companies cannot claim an unblemished performance on any of these. Their defence is effectively that OFWAT (and to a degree the Environment Agency) connived in this, because of fears for bills. But what cannot be escaped is OFWAT’s failure to properly regulate this performance.
The water companies can also point to the ambiguity of their licences. Try reading any one of these and it is as clear as mud what the companies are really liable for. Providing false information and doctoring records falls foul of the law, but failing to measure at all apparently does not. It is not hard to mount the argument that the companies have spent rather more effort in financial engineering than they have in fulfilling not just the letter of their licences, but the spirit too.
There are several things that OFWAT should do now to sort out who should pay for what.
What OFWAT should do?
(i) Re-set the balance sheets of the companies on a pro-forma basis since privatisation, based upon borrowing only for investment that has not been paid for by current customers.
(ii) Split out clearly capital maintenance, assign this to operating expenditure, and then restate the outcomes on operating expenditure on the basis of the required capital maintenance, assessed against required performance to maintain the assets and maintain the services at least constant.
(iii) Strike out the manipulation of asset lives and other accounting devices which undermine capital maintenance.
(iv) Construct an index for each company on what the state of the assets should be to meet both the letter and the spirit of the licences.
(v) Separate out clearly the cost of debt from the cost of equity and replace the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) (which incentivises financial engineering) with a split cost of capital.
This will provide OFWAT with two clear numbers for each company: the pro-forma debt and gearing, and the capital maintenance shortfall.
Armed with these two numbers, OFWAT can then distinguish between the catch-up that should be paid for by the companies, and ultimately their shareholders, and the capacity on the balance sheets to borrow for the genuine enhancements, which should be paid for by customers through the future RABs.
These two numbers should form the basis of regulation going forward.
Whilst OFWAT is cleaning up its act, there are a few other things it could usefully sort out. These include a proper tackling of the complex ownership structures and creating genuine stand-alone licensed water entities with their own balance sheets. In the process, fictions such as the claim that water customers do not pay for the ludicrous salaries in some water companies, can be punctured.

