This is the first of two papers on water. This first one addresses the sustainable water and sewerage systems; the second looks at no-regrets reforms that can be implemented now.[1]
1. Introduction
As a system meets serious structural challenges, the temptation to reach for some more sticky plasters becomes ever more attractive. Radical changes are disruptive – that is the point of them – and they create losers as well as winners. In the water case, the losers include some of the investors, and the immediate political problem is that the interests of customers and the environment upon which citizens and many businesses depend are second to the immediate challenge of making sure that what is called “investment” is financed by investors, not taxpayers.
As so often when systems become unsustainable, politicians baulk at recognising that there will have to be a rebasing and a fundamental assessment of whether the existing system is fit for purpose. In the case of water, it patently isn’t. The Victorians had to face a similar crisis. The Great Stink of London and the burgeoning need for clean water in the rapidly growing great cities of London, Birmingham and Manchester called for a step change, and with the step change a complete restructuring of the industry.
The state the water industry has got into
It’s crisis time again. Take a look at the pressures on water supplies, add in population growth and the new data centres, and it is obvious that the current assets are not fit for purpose. Take a look at the state of the water supply pipes, notice the bursts, and it is pretty obvious that patch-and-mend has long passed its sell-by date. Turn to the sewerage network, and the combined system of rainwater and sewage going down these aged pipes, into sewers that are typically old and sometimes crumbling, and it is obvious that patch-and-mend won’t work here either – and that is assuming that the water companies actually know where all their assets are and in what condition these assets are in – which they don’t.
Then turn to the financial state of the companies. The great financial engineering of the balance sheets has left some of the companies in a perilous state. Thames Water is the worst case, but others have also used their balance sheets for purposes other than financing the investments not paid for immediately by their customers. That this reflects a catastrophic regulatory failure is not much of a consolation. We are where we are. Financial distress leaves the bondholders in charge, and their interests are not the same as the public interest. Indeed, that is why we have regulation. Blaming investors for exploiting the gaping loopholes left by OFWAT is a mug’s game. Private investors maximise returns; that is what they are in business for. Regulation should align the private interests with the public interest. It hasn’t.
The result is that the government is stuck between a rock and a hard place – actually two rocks and one hard place. The two “rocks” are: customers and affordability, and their loss of trust that higher bills mean more capital maintenance and investment; and the environment and the necessity to do something about the state of the rivers, lakes and estuaries. The “hard place” is all those foreign investors, and the £100 billion that OFWAT and the companies have come up with as a number to fix the problems. The investors need higher returns – specifically, a higher cost of equity – to make the sector investable, added to which is the increase in the real cost of debt.
None of this is “new”. It has been continually analysed and reported on, and there have been endless reviews and inquiries, mostly by regulators and internally within government.
Initial sticking plasters fall flat
The government has tried to take the sting out of the political and public outcry. Its immediate legislation took aim at dividends and bonuses and director liability. It was a bit of performance politics (a bit like forcing out the Chair of the UK Competition and Markets Authority): lots of noise and speeches, but nothing fundamentally changed. The government has tried desperately to prevent Thames Water going into a Special Administration Regime (SAR), for fear of its backbenchers and their interests in going down the Railtrack/Network Rail route to nationalisation. Ministers have promised to take “tough action”. The Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs tells us that there will be no sewage in Lake Windermere by 2030 – an impossibility and a seriously misguided claim – and the old refuge is resorted to: have a review, call it independent and then promise to follow up with legislation later on (possibly). It is singing from an old and well-tried hymn sheet, with the government hoping that the latest review will get over the hurdle of the next election.
It is unlikely to work. Why? Because what is unsustainable will not be sustained.
2. Fundamental problems
However much the government wants to avoid anything that might upset the investors, and hence avoid anything “radical”, it will have to happen anyway. Thames Water may collapse before the next election, and there is an irony in the likelihood that the very thing the government wants to avoid might happen as a result of kicking the can down the road now. Nationalisation of some of the industry becomes ever more likely, the more the current game is played. Worse, the longer the crises continue to build, the weaker that outcome will be. Most of the privately owned water companies face this possibility; only the publicly listed companies are better placed to avoid this sad ending.
So what are the fundamental problems? Much as the government wants to avoid it, the best place to start is with a blank piece of paper. The government needs to ask itself what a sustainable water and sewerage industry would look like and then work out what steps should be taken now to head in this direction.
The obvious place to start is with the objectives, before later turning to the practical things that need to be done to set the industry on a path towards that outcome. These are very easy to state: we want clean drinking water and a sewerage system that does not result in the pollution of rivers, lakes and coastal areas. Nothing magic about this. Definitional content of course needs to be added.
The next question (rarely asked) is: what is the domain of the system or systems that are the basis for achieving these outcomes? The obvious answer is catchments. A sustainable water and sewerage system is based upon catchments.
Next question: who should deliver this? The answer should be whoever causally determines the state of drinking water and the state of the rivers, lakes and estuaries in the catchments. There are multiple parties that abstract water and pollute, in terms of supplies and run-off, and sewer overflows. These include: farmers, roads, local authorities, and developers. Householders cause problems too: by concreting over drives and patios; and through the lack of on-site storage like water butts; the use of chemicals, detergents and fats that are poured down the sinks and hence into the sewers; and by flushing sanitary towels and contraceptives down the toilets and of course the usual stuff. Business and schools and hospitals contribute to pollution, creating wastes that are flushed away. Cars and lorries pollute water on roads and require smooth impenetrable surfaces. Some businesses, such as data centres and heavy industry (to the extent that there is any left), also require large water supplies for non-drinking purposes, and farmers and horticulture and households do a lot of irrigation.
The point is that the water supply and sewage problems start not with the water and sewerage companies, but with us the consumers, and those who produce for us to consume their products, from shampoo to food to data. The ultimate polluters are you and me for whom all the stuff is made. The farmers and the businesses are intermediaries, and water and sewerage companies then provide the clean-up services (for drinking water and sewage), maintain the pipes and sewerage system, and run water treatment works to deliver this.
This should all be obvious, but it isn’t. The problems of water and sewage are ultimately caused by us, and the starting point must be the sources of the pollution and water demand. No fundamental solutions can be found without in the first place sorting out how to reduce the demands and the pollution.
Are the current water and sewerage companies, and their regulation, well designed to address these questions, and hence form the basis of a sustainable water and sewerage system? The answer is unambiguously no. The consequence is that more of the same will not deliver the sustainable system.
The reasons are that, first, the water and sewerage industry is only one bit of the system and it has very little control over many of the causes of the problems it deals with, and, second, its existing assets are not consistent with delivering their part.
The catchment systems as the focus of the industry
A catchment system approach starts with all the parties, not the individual silos of the water and sewerage companies. Starting with the objectives, it is then designed to make sure that the most efficient solutions are the focus. It begins with the polluters, and the incentives and regulations that apply, and then moves to all the players, including the pipes and the water and sewage treatment works.
The current structures are the exact opposite: the overwhelming focus is on end-of-pipe solutions. Farmers have very limited roles despite causing a lot of pollution, and most of this is through regulation about what they can do at the river banks and close to core water resources, and about what they can spill in terms of slurry and muck spread over the lands. There is little control over the run-off of chemicals, and this extends beyond the arable crops to livestock and, in some cases, to chicken farms (e.g. in the Rivers Wye and Usk catchments). Farming generally works on the principle that farmers need to be paid not to pollute – the exact opposite of the sustainable economy, where polluters pay.
Highways pay almost nothing towards the costs of the pollution caused by the road network and road users, and now developers are being protected from dealing with the nutrient consequences of new builds, with the emphasis back on end-of-pipe solutions to maximise housebuilding. Again, this is the exact opposite of the sustainable economy.
Accounting for a sustainable water industry
When it comes to the pipes and the water and sewage treatment works, the sustainable economy requirements are not hard to define. The assets should be treated as in perpetuity. There should be no depreciation, but rather capital maintenance to ensure that the services are provided for current and future generations. The assets-in-perpetuity extend to the rivers also.
The key point here is that almost all the spending is capital maintenance, not investment. Investment relates to enhancements to the systems, not the maintenance of the existing systems. It is not “investment” to sort out the dilapidated state of the Mogden sewage works in London, for example. It is capital maintenance, and it is the failure to do the capital maintenance that is a root cause of today’s spills and pollution.
The consequence that follows is that most of what now needs to be done to the existing systems should come out of current expenditure and not borrowing. In the sustainable economy each generation has the duty to maintain the assets-in-perpetuity so that they are passed on in a state at least as good as that generation inherited. The asset configuration may change, but the outputs are the same: clean drinking water and unpolluted rivers.
Borrowing to do capital maintenance is a new post-privatisation phenomenon. It might even be described as its main feature. By treating what is capital maintenance as investment, the next generation gets the capital maintenance and has to pay for it through the interest and capital repayment of all the debt. This is not a legitimate move in the sustainable economy.
The consequence of proper accounting is not one that customers will want to hear. It is that the current bills should pay for the capital maintenance. All that debt accumulation should have been for genuine asset enhancements only. The balance sheets of the water companies would have been profoundly different, and so would the bills. It is likely that the current bills would have been much higher had the sustainable accounting rules been followed. It follows that it is the customers who ultimately have connived in the great debt explosion – they want the next generation and not themselves to pay for maintaining the assets. Water is too cheap.
The catchment asset configuration
The asset configuration to deliver the sustainable economy – and hence to deliver the services in perpetuity – would be very different if the catchment approach is taken. The first set of assets are those that are responsible for the demands and the pollution. They are the slurry holders and pits on farms, the chicken muck containers, the toilets and drains on highways, and so on. The starting point is with the causes of the demand and the causes of pollution. The regulation of the catchment system includes regulation of these asset configurations of households and roads.
It will be necessary to know what is going into the sewers and what is coming out of the taps. This requires “smart” metering (not just metering) so that the systems can be run in real time.
Next up is the natural capital infrastructure in catchments and flood defences. The system is not just about pipes. Natural capital assets are every bit as important as pipes and sewers and water treatment works, and these assets include floodplain meadows designed to hold flood water, natural ways to dam flows (including sometimes beavers), trees, scrubland, trees and reed beds to filter out water pollution and sewage. These too should be treated as assets-in-perpetuity and require capital maintenance. Building in such upstream storm shock absorbers and natural water storage might be cheaper than building hard concrete flood defences and bypass canals.
Since natural catchment assets offer other benefits in addition to water management and hard concrete solutions, hard concrete and pipes solutions have to be better than a natural capital option if they are to be adopted. End of pipe is a last, not a first, resort.
Then there is the single rather than dual pipes system. The Victorians chose an integrated storm water and sewerage system, as did most other European countries. Why? Because in the nineteenth century, rivers were still treated very much as waste disposal systems, and because there was less storm run-off (because there was less development and more porous natural surfaces). Rainwater diluted sewage and hence lessened the need to treat it. Remember that dumping sewage in rivers and especially in the sea through outflows and sewage barges was a very normal way of doing things then. The London sewers were not designed to stop water pollution from sewage and waste: they were designed to push the sewage downstream of London and into the sea. The Thames Tideway is a London bypass in this tradition.
A sustainable water and sewerage system, if built from scratch today, would involve more dual pipes. Grey water would be separated from rainwater and, where possible, would be used and cleaned up at source. Using treated drinking water to water the garden, irrigate crops, and wash cars and premises is an absurd waste of resources. Subtract this demand from drinking water, and it is likely that the need for new reservoirs and the over-abstraction from rivers would be a much-diminished problem.
Next come storage (including simple own-storage options) and reservoirs. Storage comes in many shapes and sizes, and each catchment is different. Some reservoirs are needed, and this was the basis for the great developments in the Lake District and Wales to supply Manchester and Birmingham respectively. These are the “big ones” between catchments. Then there is storage within catchments – the smaller, more local, reservoirs. Farmoor Reservoir in Oxfordshire is an example, as are the reservoirs to the west of London and the development of the Lea Valley storage for London. The required amount of storage is after drinking water has been split from the grey water for the multiple non-drinking needs covered above.
These are not the full extent of the options. Very local options apply. These can be at the household level – the water butts. There can be on-site storage below major buildings and hotels, for example. A new data centre requires a lot of water, as it does electricity. It is common for such major installations to have on-site electricity generation, and it is a further step to store and recycle water on site as well. Even if this is not for full own-supply, it helps to moderate the demand on the system as a whole. Housing developments can have heat and power solutions, and can then have their own sewerage systems doing some treatment before being released into the main system. The scope for local storage is large and underestimated. It is not incentivised because the marginal cost of water and sewage disposal that developers face is close to zero.
3. How to design a sustainable system
We are obviously a long way from a sustainable water and sewerage system. It is a set of sustainable catchment systems that we want. We could spend years trying to define exactly each catchment and its boundaries. That is not worth doing. We know the main catchments, and we can start with these. Most water companies were set up in the public sector on this basis following the industry reorganisation in 1974. Anomalies remain, notably for the smaller water-only companies. Tidying up can be done, but it is not a main priority. What matters is that the big main catchments are dealt with.
The starting point for a sustainable catchment is a plan, and a plan needs a map. Advances in digital technology and in satellites, drones and computing allow for a fine-grained resolution of the entire surface of the planet. This is a huge step forward and allows for a level of catchment planning that was never available in the past.
Each catchment should have a detailed catchment map. This can be refined as the technology marches on, penetrating the ground surface and peering into water and seas gradually.
The catchment map needs to be “owned” by someone. That “owner” should be a Catchment Regulator. The maps should be publicly available on a public website and free to access. Everyone could then look at them and understand what’s going on. The maps should include all the relevant flood defences, natural capital assets, all the pipes, the sewers, and all the sewage and water treatment works, as well as zooming in on farmland assets and developments. (This would be an advance for the existing water and sewerage companies, many of which still don’t have their own detailed asset registers).
The maps can layer on the composition of the main water bodies. Sensors in rivers and lakes can record when and where sewage is discharged, where pollution spills take place and the concentrations of chemicals in the water. Some of this can even be done from space – for example, changes in river colouration as grey and brown sewage is discharged and as farmers’ soil and slurry discharges take place, notably (but not always) during periods of heavy rainfall. The army of citizen scientists can add their data, and where there is doubt about the quality of the data, the maps can include and exclude data to compare and contrast measurements.
It cannot be emphasised too strongly that shining a torch on the state of catchments is a necessary and extremely valuable step towards catchment planning. The output tells us how far we are from the ideal, by comparing and contrasting the catchment map as it would look if we were to enhance the sustainable outcomes, and where it is now. We will know how far adrift we are.
The next step is to simulate the range of options to improve on the state of the catchments and thus what is the best and least-cost way of getting from here to there.
How would this be done? A Catchment Regulator would be in charge of the mappings and their auditing in real time, and, against these baseline maps, invite interested parties to come forward with ideas and projects that can improve on the status quo. This is an initial invitation to submit possible projects. It is analogous to the usual expressions of interest that developers are invited to submit, ahead of formal tendering. As a publicly available tool, interested parties don’t even have to wait to be asked: they can come up with their own ideas and see how these would impact on the catchment. Local communities and local schools can “play” with the maps and do their own simulations. It is all very participation-friendly and hence democratic.
Let me give an example. In the Thames catchment, it is proposed that a canal be built around the west of Oxford to reduce the flooding in the Botley area of housing, retail and business outlets. Botley is built on a floodplain and although it might have been better to have built elsewhere, it exists; it has valuable real estate, and hence needs protection.
What happens now is that the Environment Agency (EA) comes up with a plan to reduce the flooding and asks HM Treasury to fund it. It then applies for planning permissions. In the catchment regulatory model, what happens is the output (in this case, a reduction of x in the probability of flooding) is posted on the Catchment Regulator’s website and all parties are invited to express an interest in addressing the problem, with initial outline plans.
In the Botley case, upstream wildlife organisations, farmers and those interested in new natural capital projects might suggest how the water could be stored upstream as an alternative or complementary approach, slowing flood waters down. This would bring lots of parties other than the EA into play.
The various schemes can then be simulated using the catchment maps, to show how the schemes would or would not achieve the desired outcome and all the ancillary costs and also benefits. A natural capital solution would probably involve tree-planting along the banks of the River Thames; the taking of cereal and other crop production back from the river banks; permanent pasture creation; and even traditional water meadows. Drains and ditches might be blocked up and bunds created. There would be leisure and health benefits, and biodiversity would go up.
No doubt some of these benefits would accrue in the canal option. The point of the catchment plan process described above is to explore these for all to see, and all to critique. My guess is that the natural capital upstream solution would dominate the new canal by a very wide margin, but the simulation process would show whether my hunch is correct.
Imagine this approach is also applied to the proposed new Abingdon reservoir that Thames Water wishes to build. The alternatives are other forms of storage, the reduction of leaks from the water pipes and the reduction of demand. In the Thames Valley, this must include the water storage and use options for new data centres, as well as new housing and business developments, and the type of nature and changes to road and other hard infrastructure developments discussed above.
All these options come within the very public and very transparent mapping process.
The final stage, having whittled down the catchment options against the baseline, is to invite bids. These bids will come with different funding characteristics and, where they are genuine enhancements, with finance too. The cost-efficient contract will not be set by the periodic review five-year process. Except by accident, the periodic review answer will almost certainly be the wrong answer. There will be different types of contract for each project according to its economic characteristics, and notably the project risks and timetables.
It is not hard to imagine a process like this applied to all the water and sewage and flooding issues within a catchment, and integrated through the mapping process with the planning system, new developments and new demands.
This eventually leads to everything being up for grabs, rather than the current approach that is based on three sets of monopolies: water companies; water networks and separately their sewerage networks; and the EA’s flood assets. It brings farmers (and the Environmental Land Management Schemes, or ELMS) formally into play, as well as a host of other landowners, managers and developers, including organisations like the National Trust and the Wildlife Trusts. Better still, it is completely transparent, and hence helps to build trust back amongst the wider population.
Eventually is not now. The above catchment regulation approach does cover all aspects of the catchment and does do the mapping and the scenarios and the planning. There will be lots of projects and requirements that new parties can contribute to, and indeed take over. These range from really big projects like the Thames Tideway through to direct procurement for customers (DPC) projects.
Bundled negotiated contracts for the incumbent water and sewerage companies
There will, however, remain the existing water and sewerage systems and associated water and sewage treatment works. Whilst there may be options to improve the water coming into the water treatment works and to use natural capital and other ways of tackling the sewage at the sewage treatment works, for the time being the existing siloed companies will remain necessary.
This does not mean that they need to be regulated via the cumbersome and opaque periodic reviews. We do not need PR29. Instead, there can be negotiated agreements – just not the sort of negotiated agreement that the periodic reviews comprise.
It could work is as follows. As the Catchment Regulator sets out the catchment plan, which is in continuous time, new requirements come up, new options become available, and the data changes. Instead of a blockbuster single periodic review bringing everything together in one great set piece, with a single business plan provided by the companies, the Catchment Regulator uses multiple timeframes for different parts of the contract.
For as long as the water companies own the networks, the operating contracts for these will be largely ones that will be placed by the incumbents. There will be an operating contract for the water pipes and for the sewerage services. These are not completely different from franchises. While the incumbent owns the networks, it already uses lots of contractors to carry out aspects of the works. Ownership requires a return, and if the operations and maintenance are properly contracted for, the return to pure ownership is essentially a return on the regulated asset bases (RABs).
How will negotiated agreements differ from the periodic reviews beyond the multiple time periods? The catchment regulatory approach inverts the current business plans. In the current arrangements, the water companies have licences, and these licences specify their functions. The companies come up with their corporate plans to meet their licence obligations, the environmental objectives and other legal requirements. OFWAT sits in judgement. In the catchment regulatory approach, the Catchment Regulator takes the requirements, and then auctions them in the two-stage process, as described above. For the operations side, there will probably be only one monopoly bidder: the water company. It makes its bid. The Catchment Regulator takes the bid, simulates the outcomes through the digital system maps, and may ask other parties to make their own bids too.
In the early days, the bids will probably be for small parts of the overall requirements, but this may change over time. As the domain of bidding gradually expands over time, the scope of the negotiated agreement diminishes. As it does, so too does the need for the Catchment Regulator and the industry to spend enormous amounts of time and energy on calculating and negotiating the cost of capital. As with much of the wider commercial dimensions, it is price that matters, and in a competitive process, the cost of capital is whatever the bidders decide they require to bid, and what other competitive bidders come up with. Costs become competitive; regulation retreats.
4. The evolution towards the full competitive auctioning and the repositioning of the water companies
With a clear view of what the sustainable water sector would look like, and an evolutionary pathway from the current dominance of the monopolies, there will almost certainly be structural adjustments within the companies. The most immediate is the splitting of water services from sewerage services.
In the periodic review, everything is bundled together. As regulators keep emphasising, the outcome is a “package”. In the process of bundling, very different activities, with very different risks and timescales, get combined. This is neither efficient nor is it managerially appropriate.
Go back to the catchment plan. Take sewerage. There is now a massive capital maintenance task to rebuild and reconstruct a sustainable system, and it also needs enhancements and hence investment. This goes well beyond the building of ever-bigger storage tanks at sewage treatment works to hold more storm waters. It involves a rethink of the origins of the fast storm water flows, the opportunities to create and use natural capital assets and to reconfigure the industry and household inputs and change land use and farming practices – all before the default end-of-pipe option of tank-building. The Catchment Regulator auction process is specifically designed to bring forward alternative and new ideas.
Water companies need to be able to compete too: if they cannot or do not, there will be a gaping hole and the risk is that nothing happens – no tanks and no other solutions. To put the water companies into a competitive position, they need to have a separated-out sewerage business so that they can have a negotiated sewerage contract with the Catchment Regulator and engage in enhancement opportunities.
The supply of high-quality drinking water is a very different business. All this water business has in common with the sewerage business is that it has pipes. But so do many other utilities. The requirements on a water pipe system are very different. Water is a pretty stable and predictable utility activity. Where new resources are needed, others can bid to build new reservoirs, and as and when serious smart metering comes into play, this can be contracted to specialists. Incumbent water companies already do this contracting, including for reading the meters.
The proof of the separateness of water and sewerage is reflected in the lack of synergies currently in place. There are some shared central administrative functions and a bit of labour flexibility, but these are limited and they can be provided to both by a host of business services companies, and indeed in some cases already are.
To make a success of the catchment regulatory approach, it is therefore important that the two functions be separated. This requires separate licences, and licences are needed to ensure that the providers of these services are fit and proper, just as all the electricity generators have to hold licences.
Separate licences would have added benefits. The companies could formally split the businesses into new distinct companies, each with its own internal cost of capital, and with management designed to meet the very different challenges, and to take on financial structures appropriate to their business. They can have a brighter future, especially in the growing waste businesses and the opportunities these present for what should be a major growth area for the economy.
The splits would have to extend to the RABs. There are two ways of doing this. The first is the really radical one, which is to make the RAB tradeable. This is something I proposed many years ago.[2] RABs are effectively quasi-government bonds. There is nothing that the companies can do to alter them, and they reflect past fixed and sunk costs, including the assets purchased at privatisation. If the companies were split into two and the RABs put into a third financial vehicle, the transition to a fully contractual model would be easier to implement. It would enable a disaggregated franchise model.
But this is for the future and one possibility. In the short term, the RAB could be split pro rata to the assets. Even this is somewhat arbitrary, since the assets are (or should be) in perpetuity, and many of the assets are not properly valued, and in some cases not even known.
To these benefits within the sustainable water model, there is one potentially even greater benefit to splitting water and sewerage. Sewerage is an activity with a lot of science and a lot of potential for rapid technical change. Sewerage has all sorts of values as well as costs. For example, analysing sewage is a great source of data about people’s health, their economic activities and the isolation of valuable by-products, including biomethane.
Looking through the coming decade, sewerage companies may merge and form relationships with other waste businesses, become much more scientific, and in due course there may no longer be distinct sewerage businesses as we know them now. All of these opportunities are unlocked by separating out the companies.
From the Catchment Regulator’s perspective, having separate companies specialising in just the sewerage side greatly improves the transparency and scope for developing new and novel catchment solutions. Separate companies can focus much more explicitly on the opportunities for natural capital options and for working with households and industry to deal with sewage at source.
A similar opportunity lies with the water side, with a greater focus on smart metering, with consumer incentives in mind. The water companies could move into water management services for large users, like data centres. The sole functions of the management of water-only companies are water supply and management.
Management focus is already present in the existing water-only companies that are separate from sewerage. These regulated companies are augmented by lots of local private providers, and the water-only side can incorporate the boreholes and self-supply activities, just as the sewerage side can incorporate sceptic tank provisions and storage.
Investors in the sustainable model
Investors have got used to the integrated monopoly model with RABs. England and Wales are two of the few places in the world with privatised water companies, and these utilities have provided good opportunities for a wide range of investors to provide debt and equity.
The recipe for attracting investors has been solid monopolies, with predictable, benign regulation. The intention at privatisation was that the new private owners would make abnormal returns by outperforming the regulatory contract set within the periodic reviews. The central idea in RPI-X at the outset was that the monopolies would be price-takers, and that they would maximise profits – and hence returns – by minimising costs. Customers would be better off because the lower costs realised as a result of the strong incentives would lead to lower bills in the medium term as the prices were rebased at periodic reviews. This was regarded as a massive advantage over nationalised industries, and rate of return-regulated private utilities. The cost gains would be greater than the cost of capital premia.
It turns out that these efficiency incentives played a minor part in the returns to investors, although, given the asymmetry of information between the monopolies and the regulator, the repeated underestimate of the likely cost profile added extra “spice” to the private returns. In the event, there is little evidence that the England and Wales private companies are any more or less efficient than their state and locally owned European comparators.
Where investors really made their money was in the difference between the ex ante set interest rates and the outturn, as the great 30 years of monetary relaxation to ever-lower-than-predicted outcomes unfolded, and through financial engineering. The two were related: lower interest rates made debt cheaper and cheaper, and, in real terms, even “free”, as real interest rates went negative.
The financial engineering opportunities were the result of appallingly bad regulation by OFWAT. Setting a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) meant that the allowed returns at periodic reviews were, by definition (it’s an average), greater than the cost of debt and less than the cost of equity. The great gearing-up of the balance sheets was the obvious thing to do by investors seeking returns, and incredibly (and before 1994 no one exploited this opportunity), regulators allowed it to happen. Balance sheets that were intended to provide for investment in a new pay-when-delivered model were geared up for financial gains, leaving the current stretched balance sheets with little capacity to do what they now needed to do. Thames Water is the most obvious casualty, but it is not alone.
Now the game has changed. The gearing has reached its limits, the money has been extracted, and now the investors need to put equity into the companies. It is estimated that over £100 billion needs now to be invested. Put aside that it is mostly not investment, but rather capital maintenance, since the customers are not to be asked to “pay as you go” for capital maintenance (which they should be in a sustainable model), the use of the WACC makes this singularly unattractive. If the WACC is set correctly, then putting new equity in guarantees a loss. This can already be seen in the discount to RABs for the market values appearing in Southern Water, Thames Water, and arguably in the rights issues of the listed companies.
This is unsustainable. The game is up, and the companies are now vulnerable to vulture debt companies, and to the associated expropriation of the RABs. New players coming to the table are able to gain large returns not from the original model’s incentives and structure, but by expropriating existing shareholders, buying companies at discounts and playing games around distressed debt, rival debt haircuts and a host of short-term opportunities. No one wants to invest in Thames Water, for example, at the RAB valuation when it comes to new equity; as debt-holders seize control, their interests play across to partnering with new equity investors who come in at significant RAB discounts.
This can be very profitable, and for some in the Thames Water example, it clearly is. PIMCO has already booked a 17% return on the emergency loans at punitive interest rates. But it is not obviously in the public interest or, more narrowly, that of the customers. Control of Thames Water, the largest water company in Europe, appears to be on offer for around £4 billion against a RAB of around £20 billion.
Why all this matters for the catchment regulatory model is that to bring forward genuine investment and hence equity from investment providers (as opposed to trading in the second-hand RABs), the existing model is unlikely to deliver. It will be a feast for the vultures, but not for the catchments and their customers. What the sustainable model does is to take the heat out of the endless games around the cost of capital and make it largely market-determined. That is what has happened in electricity generation through the auctioning of the contracts for differences (CfDs) through the National Energy System Operator (NESO), and the catchment regulatory model is analogous to this aspect of the NESO’s activities (but not, as in the NESO case, the operation of the system itself).
5. Who pays whom? Where do the monies go?
To see how the catchment regulatory model works in terms of the money, the starting point is to think through all the money currently spent within the catchments. This includes the money that goes on flood defence, the ELMS, nature conservation, environmental planning, by local authorities, and from customers paying their water bills. There is also the money from the Treasury, which goes to the EA, notably for flood defences, and via DEFRA to the farmers in ELMS and related payments.
These spending lines are all administrated separately; they are mostly in silos and the results are at best suboptimal and sometimes perverse. A centralised administrative function is a good starting point, at least in regard of direct catchment spending.
For water and sewerage within a catchment, the main line of payment is to the incumbent water company. Even here, there are overlaps, including with the “competitive” providers. Since the money goes to the monopoly utilities, this is the obvious contracting basis. The DPCs, for example, are paid for via the water utilities, and the Thames Tideway depends upon Thames Water’s RAB.
In the catchment regulatory model, there are financial flows into the auctions, and payments and contracts going out. There are two possible models: the Catchment Regulator could collect the monies and pay them out; or there could be a version of the use-of-system charge that applies in the case of electricity and which is collected via the energy supply companies. NESO awards capacity and CfDs, and the payments to the generators come from customers’ bills, which are administered by distributors, the National Grid, and end up with customers through the suppliers’ bills.
The key point about the NESO model is that we, the customers, pay all the costs through a single bill. Billing, collection and bad debt management then lead to an allocation of the monies to the various parties delivering the services. In the water case, the single bill could be used to pay for the flood defences, the water and sewerage services, the natural capital and other asset enhancements (via the interest and dividend payments and the capital repayments) and any other catchment services. The Catchment Regulator auctions the contracts and carries out the negotiated agreement contracting with the incumbents, and then the monies from the bills are allocated out.
It remains for government to decide whether the catchment bills should include everything, including flood defence, or whether some should come from taxpayers. It also remains for government to decide on social tariffs and the rules for bad debt and disconnections.
In the sustainable water model, a single catchment charge is preferable, and it would be better raised separately from the water and sewerage companies, to avoid the confusion as to who is responsible for what. But that is for the future: it is not necessary to get the catchment regulatory model going.
Amongst the monies raised, there would need to be coverage of the existing and evolving RABs. As indicated above, these can be sterilised in a tradeable entity separate from the companies’ operating costs. The RABs in the catchment regulatory model are essentially the way in which sunk and fixed costs are remunerated, and these might be expanded to include flood defence and natural capital investments. Detaching the RABs from the incumbents makes them catchment RABs, from which the incumbent utilities get their financial returns for their parts of the overall catchment RABs.
6. An evolutionary transitional path to the sustainable water industry
We are where we are. This is the starting point, and the show has to go on whilst the system is reformed. It turns out that quite a lot of the building blocks are already in place, and the transition falls into a number of managed steps.
There are some no-regret steps that are required whether or not the Catchment Regulator is set up.[3] Given the multiple failures of regulation to date, a series of immediate actions should be initiated. These include dealing with Thames Water and taking the preparatory work inside government for a SAR for Thames before allowing the company’s position to deteriorate further. Active preparation for the failure of other water companies should be rapidly upgraded so that there is not a disorderly collapse, which would probably lead to a more general nationalisation, as per the rail example.
The splitting of water from sewerage in the incumbent companies with the issue of separate licences is an immediate action that is no regrets, even within the existing frameworks. So, too, is developing digital mapping of catchments, including digital maps of the assets and digital reporting of sewage spills. It should not be for outside experts, such as Professor Peter Hammond, to reveal what is and has been going on.
Even within the existing structures there is much to do to improve performance, but, even if done well, this will not solve the longer-term problems. For this, structural change is needed and that can build on and evolve from what is already going on.
The first step is to sort out the objectives, and identify the gap between the baseline and the desired outcomes – the gap between the unsustainable and the sustainable. This requires the digitalised mapping of each catchment so that a catchment plan can be developed.
Catchment management plans already exist and lots of work on catchment modelling is already in place. It is a starting point, but it lacks two things: that someone is in charge; and that it is integrated into a digital open-access tool.
To achieve the first step, the Catchment Regulator has to be established. Whilst it might be possible to do this inside the existing water companies, or the EA, the challenge is then how to migrate these to an independent platform. In the case of the NESO, it has only been achieved through regulatory separation of the system operator inside National Grid and then its legislated extraction. It has not worked yet in the case of the distribution network operators (DNOs).
Water is catchment-based, and hence there is no national equivalent of the NESO. Putting the catchment planning inside each utility excludes catchment activities outside their domain, and has obvious incentive problems. Step one is to make a clean break now.
Setting up the Catchment Regulator requires people and technology. Many of these skills are “new”. It is overwhelmingly a digital activity, involving the use of AI, and the existing EA (and certainly DEFRA) staff lack many of these skills. It needs a new digital expertise. The good news is that this is needed anyway.
Stop two is to abandon PR29 now, and to announce the general use of negotiated agreements and auctioning beyond 2029, with a mix of different types of contracts and contract durations. Between now and 2029, the DPCs and related works can begin to be auctioned separately from the incumbent companies. The negotiated agreements take over much of the periodic review processes anyway, and there will be DPCs and other vehicles for large capital expenditures. These can be agreed via the Catchment Regulator, and where possible via auctions. There can be rollovers of the existing periodic review parameters if the legislation to set up the Catchment Regulators is slow to be pushed through Parliament.
Step three is to begin the gradual closure of OFWAT. The ongoing functions in relation to the licence management and the oversight of the industry can be put into a transition unit within the Catchment Regulators. As a holding position, many of the powers can be transferred into the Catchment Regulator. Experience from merging functions into the EA and into OFCOM provides precedents.
It is important to avoid ending up in the absurd and costly outcome in energy, whereby the NESO is regulated by OFGEM. The Catchment Regulators should be public not private, and hence not need the regulation that the NESO’s corporate format does.
Step four is to establish the formal planning functions and build up the digital maps and the stages for the auctions and negotiated agreements on a public website with the ability to simulate alternative projects and their outcomes.
Step five is to introduce the new catchment billing process, after a transition to a more general and inclusive format and billing platform by, say, the end of the PR24 period.
Step six is to start the process of separating out the RABs, with the eventual creation of a general RAB fund, debt-financed only and tradeable.
The new model can be given a starting date of 2030, with a shadow system established between then and now.
7. Conclusion
The current model is not sustainable. It will not be sustained. The default outcome is nationalisation, as with the railways. Its likelihood should not be underestimated. It would be widely popular, and the failure to use the SAR in the Thames Water case has considerably increased its likelihood – the opposite of the government’s intentions in preventing the SAR coming into play. The fact that control of Thames is for sale for only £4 billion makes the nationalisation route more plausible.
The nationalised industry model worked in the past; it could work again, but times have moved on. Such a model is unlikely to create a sustainable industry because the requirements of digitalisation, open catchment plans and modelling, public engagement with the modelling of options, and the extensive use of auctions and contracts would come up against lots of political and practical difficulties in a wholly public sector industry. It remains to be seen whether the private equity owners are up for these changes or will obstruct them.
The catchment regulatory model is the best chance to create sustainable water and sewerage services, and it is practical to evolve it from there to now.
[1] Water paper 2: Helm, D. (2025), “No-regrets water reforms”, forthcoming, Thurs 10th April.
[2] Helm, D. (2008), “Tradeable RABS and the split cost of capital”, January.
[3] See water paper 2: Helm, D. (2025), “No-regrets water reforms”, forthcoming, Thurs 10th April.

